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[L. A. No. 19745. In Bank. May 13, 1947.] 
NAT WILK, Appellant, v. CHARLES A. VENCILL et al, 
Respondents. 
[1] Frauds, Statute of-Estoppel to Aas8rt.-A wife who refused 
to carry out a promise to sign a contract to sell residential 
property owned by her and her husband in joint tenancy is 
estopped to invoke the statute of frauds where the prospec_ 
tive purchaser, in reliance on her representations that she 
consented to the sale and would sign the contract and also on 
her acts in encouraging his preparations to move into the 
house with his family, relinquished an opportunity to buy an-
other home in that neighborhood. 
[2] Speci1lc Performance - Pleading - Complaint.-ln an action 
for specific performance of a eontract to sell residential prop-
erty owned in joint tenancy by husband and wife, a com-
plaint alleging her refusal to carry out a promise to sign the 
contract and facts which would estop bel' from relyin~ on 
the statute of frauds. including plaintiff's loss of an oppor-
tunity to purchase another bome in reliance on such promise, 
was not insufficient because of the failure to aUege that the 
wife knew of such opportunity. 
[3) Frauds. Statute of - Estoppel to Assert. - The doctrine of 
estoppel is not destructive of the statute of frauds. Without 
the qualifying doctrine of estoppel in a proper case, the 
statute would encourage rather than prevent the perpetra-
tion of frauds. 
[4a, 4b] Speci1lc Performance - Pleading - Demurrer.-ln an aa-
tion for specific performance of a contract to sell realty owned 
in joint tenancy by busband and wife, it was error to sustain 
the husband's demurrer to the complaint without leave to 
amend, assuming that the complaint was insufficient as to the 
wife because she refused to sign the contract, where the con-
tract did not show on its face that botb joint tenants were to 
sign. 
[6] CotenanC)'-Joint Tenancl-Conveyancea. - One joint tenant 
may dispose of his interest in real property without the Mn-
sent of the other. 
(ll See 12 CaLJur. 935; 49 Am.Jur. 888. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Frauds, Statute of, § 59(4); [2] 
Specific Performance, § 101; [3] Frauds, Statute of, § 59(1); [4] 
Specifio Performance, ~ 124; [5] Cotenancy, § 7; [6] Specific Per-
formance, § 16; [7] Specifio Performance, § 29(1); [8] Pleadilll. 
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,''''~_A~ Performance-Availability of Remedy.-A party may 
to convey more than he possesses and, although he canA 
fully perform, specifIc performance may be available in 
far as it is possible. 
- Oontract - Oertainty. - A contract to sell residential 
owned in joint tenancy by husband and wife was 
~lclEjntlLy clear in it!l statement of terms to support a decree 
performancf where it recited that a designated 
of the purchase price was to be deposited in escrow 
a certain tim" after a property settlement agreement 
executed between the seller and his wife, that the prop-
was to be subject to encumbrances for the unpaid bal-
and that the wife would surrender possession of the 
...... , ...... 1'1tv when she was able to procure other living accommo-
.~I&d:1nlr - Demurrer to Oomplaint - Amendment After De-
8Usta,1nE~d.--Where a complaint is sufficient as against 
".'PBnlmLi demurrer, it is improper to sustain special demurrers 
,'='.,.-.~ .. leave to amend . 
• "" ."...,.u from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
County. Alfred E. Paone&'Ia .• Judge. Reversed. 
for specific performance or damages. Judgment of 
after sustaining demurrers to complaint without 
amend. reversed. 
G. Bergman for Appellant. 
H. Robinson and Harold M. Heimbaugh for Be-
J.-This appeal is from a judgment of the 
court dismissing an action for specific performance 
after defendants' demurrers to plaintiff's fourth 
l~"" .. .ul1J'Q"'U had been sustained without leave to amend. 
are alleged in the fourth amended 
hu.qband and wife, are the owners 
ten311~~y of a house and lot. On July 24, 1945, plain-
UeJ:t:n4118IU. hUl~band executed the following agreement: 
of Nat Wilko the sum of Ten Dollars as part 
for my real property located at 425 North Martel 
Angeles, California. 
, entire price to be paid for the above described prop-
~he sum of Eighty-Nine Hundred Dollars and to be 
, follows: 
I I ) 
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"Five Thousand Dollars Cash in escrow to be commenced 
within thirty days after a property settlement agreement ill 
executed between the undersigned seller herein and his wife. 
"Also this property to be sold to said Nat Wilk subject to 
two encumbrances wherein their total unpaid balance.q ill the 
sum of approximately Thirty-Nine Hundred Dollars. 
"Further this within option to purchase the above described 
property is made with the specifie understanding that the 
undersign's wife will surrender possession thereof when and 
if she is able to procure other living accommodations. 
Dated July 24, 1945. 
Chas. A. Vencill 
"I accept the within option. 
"July 24, 1945. 
Nat Wilk" 
Plaintiff gave defendant wife a copy of this agreement and 
requested that she join in its execution. She stated that she 
approved of and consented to the sale and agreed to sign 
the agreement as well as any other documents necessary to 
tbe transfer of title. Mrs. Vencill informed plaintiff of mario 
tat difficulties between her and her husband and said that 
they were living apart and were negotiating a property set· 
tlement She stated that she wished to defer executi~n of the 
agreement until she and her husband completed their property 
settlement agreement. She estimated that this would be 
accomplished in about a week from .July 24. 1945, and that 
immediately thereafter she would sign the agreement to sell 
the property. 
Plaintiff was negotiating to purchase another home for 
himself and his family in the neighborhood where defendants 
live. The price was approximately the same a.q that fixed 
by defendants for their house. and the two houses were much 
alike. Plaintiff decided to purchase defendants' house and 
the other house was subsequently sold to another. When de-
fendants later refused to sell there was no other house avail-
able in that neighborhood. Within a day or two after Mr. 
Vencill signed the agreement to which Mrs. Vencill orally 
assented, plaintiff made arrangements, in her presence. with 
painters and contractors to make repairs and improvements 
to the property. Mrs. Vencill told plaintiff that she wa.q 
happy that he and his family were going to live in the house 
and that she preferred them to any other prospective pur-
chasers. She stated that she was sure that they would be 
) 
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happy in the home after it was redecorated and repaired. 
'('he next day she agreed to sell the bedroom rugs to plaintiff, 
a price to be fixed when she moved out. Plaintiff spent 
two weeks after July 24, 1945, cutting, cleaning and 
.':· .... ·tel'1in2 the grounds and premises, devoting his time thereto 
of his law practice. He also expended $10 
another person to assist him. 
lJe:ren.aa:nts executed their property settlement agreement 
'or about .July 31. 1945. and at' that time, or immediately 
. . , plaintiff asked 'Mrs. Vencill to carry out her agree-
Mrs. Vencill refused. stating that she was arranging 
the property to others, having been advised that plain-
not enforce the performance of her promise. 
Plaintiiff contends that when Mrs. Vencill made her prom-
did 80 with the secret reservation not to perform and 
the intention of misleading and deceiving him. Plaintiff 
iII!IIlClerEKl the $5.000 within the prescribed time and the tender 
refused. Be states that the price of $8.900 is fair and 
fair at the time of the execution of the agreement. The 
eteJrl(:Iants agreed to sell the proprty to another on or about 
15. 1945. for about $9.000. but this sale has not yet 
. eonsummated. Plaintiff reC'luests specific performance or, 
is not possible. damages. Both defendants separately 
1Mi1111'1"li'P.d generally and specially and their demurrers were 
ISt8.mE~ without leave to amend. 
Plaintiff contends that although Mrs. Vencill did not 
contract 8."1 required by the statute of frauds (Code 
§ 1973: Civ. Code, § 1624). her conduct was 
. to bar her from invoking the statute. Defendants 
that plaintiff can show only that he relied upon her 
to sign the sales contract and that the failure to 
with a promise cannot serve as a basis for estoppel. 
contention was advanced in Seymour v. Oelrichs, 
.. 792, 797 [l06 P. 88. 134 Am.St.Rep. 154], upon 
del:enclan1t8 rely. It was there stated that although the 
to make a writing as agreed is not such fraud as will 
Ii ease from the operation of the statute of frauds . 
. the doctrine of equitable estoppel u a representation 
:.:Jmt1Ill-~ ~tention, absolute in . form, deliberately made for 
DmI"Ml!lP. of induencing the conduct of the other party 
upon by the other party, 1. . generally the source 
and may amount to a contract enforceable as such 
'11'-.• ;-. ....... of equity." (Pp. 797-798.) Plaintiff alleged that 
) 
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lirs. Vencill told him that she consented to the sale and that 
she would sign the agreement in the near future; that in reli-
ance upon her representations and acts he relinquished his 
opportunity to buy another home in that neighborhood within 
his price range; and that her words and acts led him to rely 
upon the security of his agreement. He thereby lost more 
than the subject of the agreement; he lost the opportunity 
to purchase another home. [2] Plaintiff does not allege that 
Mrs. Vencill knew of his opportunity to buy another home. 
but he states that he can prove. that she did and that he re-
quested the trial court to allow him to amend his complaint 
in order to add this allegation. The failure to make the alle-
gation, however, is not fatal to his statement of a canse of 
action. The objeet of Mrs. Vencill's representations was to 
lead plaintiff to consider himself entitled to buy her house 
and to regard his search for a family home as ended. She 
encouraged his preparations to move into her house with his 
family. Since his change of position was a natural and 
probable consequence of his reliance upon her representa-
tions. it is immaterial whether or not she actually knew of hi~ 
opportunity to purchase another home in that neighborhood 
[3] The doctrine of estoppel is not destructive of th(' 
statute of frauds. (Halsey v. Robinson, 19 Cal.2d 476. 48:! 
[122 P.2d 11].) Without the qualifying doctrine of estoppel 
in a proper case the statute would encourage rather than pre-
vent the perpetration of frauds. (Wilson v. Bailey, 8 CaL2d 
416, 422 [65 P.2d 770].) [4] Plaintiff must still establi"h 
the truth of his allegations. and if he does not prove the con· 
tract, the reliance. and the change of position by a prepon· 
derance of the evidence. he cannot recover. (See Notten v. 
Mensing, 3 Cal.2d 469. 477 [45 P.2d 198]; Notten v. Men-
sing, 20 Cal.App.2d 694. 697 [67 P.2d 734].) 
Mr. Vencill contends that if his wife is successful in her 
defense on the statute of frauds. he cannot be held to the 
contract on the ground that where one of two joint tenants 
contracts to sell real estate and the other joint tenant doe'! 
not execute the contract, the party executing the agreement 
cannot be compelled to convey his own undivided interest 
since he contracted to sell the entire property and not simply 
his undivided interest therein. Assuming that plaintiff can-
not sustain his burden of proof as against Mrs. Vencill, it 
does not follow that plaintiff's complaint against her husband 
must be dismissed. [5] One joint tenant may dispose of 
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. interest without the cOllilent of the other. (Delanoy v. 
~"lJ'.uJ'~, 216 Cal. 23, 26 [13 P.2d 513].) [6] Further, a 
may agree to convey more than he possesses and, al-
he cannot fully perfonn, specific perfonnance may be 
~·.:rI_"'A in so far as it is possible. (Armstrong v. Sacramento 
.B. 00.,52 Cal.App. 110. 116 [198 P. 217]; see 5 Williston 
. Contracts, § 1436; Rest., Contracts, § 365.) [4b] The 
does not show on its face that both joint tenants were 
Mr. Vencill, in view of his impending separation, 
intended to convey his interest whatever the deci-
his wife. The nature and extent of plaintiff's recov-
. any, against Mr. Vencill will be decided after the 
been presented to the trial court. It was there-
to sustain Mr. Vencill's demurrer. regardless of 
~,,,.I-UAl't5 with respect to his wife. 
are other objections raised by defendants, establish-
most only plaintiff's inability to obtain specific per-
['1] The contract is sufflciently clear in its state-
to support a decree of specific performance 
::.uotI.MU v. ltuffer, 68 CaI.App.2d 376, 383 [156 P.2d 
. and the trial court may require additional clafifications 
'pleadings if necessary, or deny specific performance 
remedy is not proper. [8] The complaint is sufticient 
a general demurrer, however. and in such a case it is 
to sustain special demurrers without leave to amend. 
P'rR01Ia Pictures Oorp. 11. De Toth, 26 Ca1.2d 753, 762 
217, 162 A.L.R. 747]; Wilkerson v. 8610, 20 Cal. 
[127 P.2d 904].) 
U.Ut{UlI" .... is reversed. 
C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, 
tJpenee. l., oou.cmrecl. 
